10/14/2003
Discourse Theory
I've read just enough about discourse theory that I want to read more. This is my spin on discourse theory mixed with my personal view of culture.
Culture is a very important thing to think about. What makes it powerful is that people define themselves within it. If you control culture, well hotdamn, you control people. While there's many viewpoints to consider culture from (historical, interpretive [sitting in the field and just watching it, like Jane Goodall with apes], etc.) one of the most interesting to me is power.
If culture creates humans, and humans create culture, what is the way humans go about creating that culture? Communication, or, discourse. Discourse is more than a system of shared meanings and symbols (IE culture), but is "a site of power, a struggle among competing versions of truth and a site in which individuals are literally created or constituted." The process of discourse defines truth, and so culture.
Culture uses discourse to force normative control on individuals to mold them into the shape of that culture. Cultures role as a meaning giver forces the question: who is supplying the meaning? To answer that, you have to first ask yourself who is controlling discourse. It depends on which culture you're referring to. In the only two countries I have any real familiarity with, the United States and Japan, I see that a decentralized network of rich elites and techna/buera-crats control discourse. It occurs through a variety of ways, though I suppose mass media has been the most popular medium as of late. Certainly it is not the only way. Use of the schooling system, corporations, structure of law,and lobbying/pressure groups are other forms. All these are means of shaping discourse by those of relative power.
So, follow me in the circle:
Individuals derive meaning and identity from culture. Culture is defined by discourse. Discourse is the negotiation of truth. Discourse is controlled by those in power, so effectively, those in power control truth. And since the negotiated concept of truth (discourse) defines culture, which in turn gives individuals meaning, those in power control individuals.
Hopefully I haven't contradicted myself too many times ;)
Oh and for my personal reference here are my notes for Organizational Communication class.
Formal & Informal COmmunication Networks
Organizational Culture
Discuss
Culture is a very important thing to think about. What makes it powerful is that people define themselves within it. If you control culture, well hotdamn, you control people. While there's many viewpoints to consider culture from (historical, interpretive [sitting in the field and just watching it, like Jane Goodall with apes], etc.) one of the most interesting to me is power.
If culture creates humans, and humans create culture, what is the way humans go about creating that culture? Communication, or, discourse. Discourse is more than a system of shared meanings and symbols (IE culture), but is "a site of power, a struggle among competing versions of truth and a site in which individuals are literally created or constituted." The process of discourse defines truth, and so culture.
Culture uses discourse to force normative control on individuals to mold them into the shape of that culture. Cultures role as a meaning giver forces the question: who is supplying the meaning? To answer that, you have to first ask yourself who is controlling discourse. It depends on which culture you're referring to. In the only two countries I have any real familiarity with, the United States and Japan, I see that a decentralized network of rich elites and techna/buera-crats control discourse. It occurs through a variety of ways, though I suppose mass media has been the most popular medium as of late. Certainly it is not the only way. Use of the schooling system, corporations, structure of law,and lobbying/pressure groups are other forms. All these are means of shaping discourse by those of relative power.
So, follow me in the circle:
Individuals derive meaning and identity from culture. Culture is defined by discourse. Discourse is the negotiation of truth. Discourse is controlled by those in power, so effectively, those in power control truth. And since the negotiated concept of truth (discourse) defines culture, which in turn gives individuals meaning, those in power control individuals.
Hopefully I haven't contradicted myself too many times ;)
Oh and for my personal reference here are my notes for Organizational Communication class.
Formal & Informal COmmunication Networks
Organizational Culture
Discuss
8/11/2003
Elusive State
Concept of elusive state
Definitions to get out of the way. Author uses these terms, these ways:
Nation - Defined by a shared language and sense of cultural separateness
State - Ultimate repository and arbiter of power within a country
Japan has a clear sense of nation, not a clear sense of being a state. In most governments you can point to some group that clearly has power, or defacto power. In Japan there is no such clearly recognizable group. Power rests between the diet, bureaucracy, zaikai (business groups), and a few smaller players. Everything is based on informal networks, with no way to go "up the chain" to resolve issues or clear path to create new initiatives. Groups have semi-autonomous power, power-sharing throughout.
So the source of power is unclear. If you look at history there is precedent for this. Compared to neighboring China who had many different kinds of state systems, Japan had a state system only for a brief period of time. Usually the real seat of power was unclear, meaning that somewhere behind the current shogun or emperor of the day was the seat of real power. Ambiguous as to be un-attackable and unseatable.
More recently, during the early Meiji period the genro (elite statesmen who founded the restoration) guided Japan sharing power loosely amongst them. Any attempt to create a party system that would clearly delineate power was always blocked (though one was finally created).
One-ish party system. Since Japan looks to have the most democratic system in Asia to most, it's easy to be misled. However in much of Asia personal connections are far more important than the more recent, formal government/political institutions. And Japan is no exception.
Japan has been a one party system since 1955 (LDP). LDP has no organization amongst grass root, no agreed on mechanism for regulating succession in leadership, and has no identifiable political principles. LDP vote getting machine uses rural development promises to get huge votes in outlying/agricultural areas, along with just a lot of money.
Of course there are other parties like the JSP, JCP, and DSP, but besides occasionally getting press attention they don't threaten the LDP. One reason for this is debates that are held in the diet are hollow, as so those conversations are of no relevance. Power of bureaucrats cannot be forgotten, as well as other power holders.
So what is the LDP's true power, if diet procedures are largely irrelevant past rubber-stamping? The LDP is differentiated for their personal privileges and the ability to relay to bureaucrats request for favors from lobbying supporters. Basically, a stronger informal network.
Ministries and agencies. Since power doesn't seem to be with the parliamentarians, many think it must be with the bureaucrats in their ministries. They are not the true base of power, but they probably proportionally have more power then those in the diet.
In the everyday business of governing Japan, groups of officials, especially those of the ministries of finance, international trade and industry, construction, and post and telecommunications have a lot of power. They make nearly all laws that are passed onto to be rubber-stamped by the diet.
This informal power, because not exposed to debate about it's merits, is very open-ended.
But there is a great deal of rivalry between ministries. Often formal meetings involving multiple ministry heads end in dead-lock. Territorial issues among ministries and agencies obstruct the formulation of unified national policies. So there is no "ultimate power" with the ministries. Again, we see semi-autonomous power sharing.
Zaikai. One popular belief is that the top group of business grouping/conglomerates control the LDP and bureaucrats. This is false. Business associations do have extremely big power.
One such federation is Keidanren, a grouping of leading industrial organizations (auto, ship building, iron and steel, petroleum, chemical, trading companies, wholesale, banks, insurance, securities, etc.). Also important is Nikkeiren (Japan Federation of Employers Association), which keeps the labor movement in check and keeps wage increases down.
Viewed as a class, contemporary businessmen buy political power on a regularly basis. They maintain leverage over most LDP Diet members by footing re-election campaigns. But their power is still limited, and informal bureaucratic control over business reaches far. So business still relies on LDP to interact with bureaucracy.
So, these three bodies all share power, and no eloquent equation can show precisely what the shape/sharing of power is. Power fluxes at a given time.
So why was a state not formed after the American occupation? Maybe Americans were expecting a clear dictatorship like Hitler or Mussolini, and so were no good at dismantling the informal networks. If anything they cut out some deadwood when dismantling zaibatsu, and otherwise clearing house with the mass firing of government officials (who many they later let back in anyway, as the Korean war came on and America realized they needed Japan strong).
Additionally after 1945 Japan never had to worry if it was a state or not, since it was hardly ever called upon to act as a political entity. Japan became dependent on the US not only for it's defense, but also it's diplomacy. Japan was able to deal with countries on the basis of purely economic priorities, with less regard to political consequences. Though this is changing.
Other sources of power. The press have a lot of influence on popular sentiment, though the newspaper dailies and news tend to speak as one voice.
The National Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives presides over local co-op's, regional federations, and special business organizations that represent over 8% of Japan's workforce employed in farming. It has a symbiotic relationship with the Ministry of Agriculture. The ministry, in cooperation with LDP, keeps rice prices high. In return, LDP candidates in rural areas are given near unconditional support.
There is also of course the yakuza with their huge protection rackets and control of entertainment districts. The police maintain an unacknowledged symbiotic relationship with the gangster syndicates in the interesting of keeping crime under organized control.
So how does the public perceive state? Tax collector, the police, and vast body of regulations. But this perception may vanish when accountability is called into question. For instance, most Japanese historically consider the puppet state of Manchuko to be "the army's" colony, but not Japan's.
So there is a tendency for Japanese to not see themselves as being symbolically part of a state whose responsibility they therefore share.
The system. Author uses the term 'System' instead of state to define Japan body politic. He says "it denotes little more than the existence of a set of relationships, with reasonably predictable effects, between those engaged in socio-political pursuits." The individual is rarely allowed to forget the existence of socio-political arrangements that are infinitely stronger than the individual could ever bear.
Public-private realm. When comparing employment numbers in Japan's public realm vs. Private to other countries, Japan comes in surprisingly low. Japan's number of public employee's is 1/3 of Britain and about one half of the USA and Germany. However the difference is once again the delineation of power. In the other powers, state interference can be dulled out as needed, for praise of punishment. But Japanese bureaucratic participation tends to resist analysis.
There are however several processes done by bureaucracies that can be singled out in terms of public-private interaction. The Japanese government have power of awarding licenses and other permission for commercial pursuits, withholding advantages like subsidies, tax privileges or low-interesting loans at their discretion.
Every year around three hundred bureaucrats join the business world as directors or senior advisors of corporations (often after retirement). This creates 'smooth communication' between ministries and business. This phenomenon is called amakudarai (decent from heaven). A personal acquaintance with government officials and a close familiarity with bureaucratic priorities is extremely important to 'adjust' policy.
But corporations, it should be remembered, are not autonomous, but semi-autonomous. Most companies belong to conglomerates. Between 60-70 percent of all shares in the Japanese stock exchange are held by Japanese corps or financial institutions. They keep shares within their conglomerate family, in a pattern of reciprocal shareholding. The shares are considered to be political rather than investment, and are never sold. This eliminates the possibility of take-overs by outsiders.
As to small entrepreneurs, they are generally subcontracters under larger firms. However they are often dependent on the market to a limited extent. Collectively they are a shock-absorbing cushion in periods of economic downturn, and explain the large bankruptcy rate in Japan, as they often go under during bad economic times.
In summary. The system has a unity in purpose in disseminating a particular world-view that encourages the maintenance of existing power. However it has a weak ability in a crisis to sacrifice existing power relations for the sake of a unified policy program.
Definitions to get out of the way. Author uses these terms, these ways:
Nation - Defined by a shared language and sense of cultural separateness
State - Ultimate repository and arbiter of power within a country
Japan has a clear sense of nation, not a clear sense of being a state. In most governments you can point to some group that clearly has power, or defacto power. In Japan there is no such clearly recognizable group. Power rests between the diet, bureaucracy, zaikai (business groups), and a few smaller players. Everything is based on informal networks, with no way to go "up the chain" to resolve issues or clear path to create new initiatives. Groups have semi-autonomous power, power-sharing throughout.
So the source of power is unclear. If you look at history there is precedent for this. Compared to neighboring China who had many different kinds of state systems, Japan had a state system only for a brief period of time. Usually the real seat of power was unclear, meaning that somewhere behind the current shogun or emperor of the day was the seat of real power. Ambiguous as to be un-attackable and unseatable.
More recently, during the early Meiji period the genro (elite statesmen who founded the restoration) guided Japan sharing power loosely amongst them. Any attempt to create a party system that would clearly delineate power was always blocked (though one was finally created).
One-ish party system. Since Japan looks to have the most democratic system in Asia to most, it's easy to be misled. However in much of Asia personal connections are far more important than the more recent, formal government/political institutions. And Japan is no exception.
Japan has been a one party system since 1955 (LDP). LDP has no organization amongst grass root, no agreed on mechanism for regulating succession in leadership, and has no identifiable political principles. LDP vote getting machine uses rural development promises to get huge votes in outlying/agricultural areas, along with just a lot of money.
Of course there are other parties like the JSP, JCP, and DSP, but besides occasionally getting press attention they don't threaten the LDP. One reason for this is debates that are held in the diet are hollow, as so those conversations are of no relevance. Power of bureaucrats cannot be forgotten, as well as other power holders.
So what is the LDP's true power, if diet procedures are largely irrelevant past rubber-stamping? The LDP is differentiated for their personal privileges and the ability to relay to bureaucrats request for favors from lobbying supporters. Basically, a stronger informal network.
Ministries and agencies. Since power doesn't seem to be with the parliamentarians, many think it must be with the bureaucrats in their ministries. They are not the true base of power, but they probably proportionally have more power then those in the diet.
In the everyday business of governing Japan, groups of officials, especially those of the ministries of finance, international trade and industry, construction, and post and telecommunications have a lot of power. They make nearly all laws that are passed onto to be rubber-stamped by the diet.
This informal power, because not exposed to debate about it's merits, is very open-ended.
But there is a great deal of rivalry between ministries. Often formal meetings involving multiple ministry heads end in dead-lock. Territorial issues among ministries and agencies obstruct the formulation of unified national policies. So there is no "ultimate power" with the ministries. Again, we see semi-autonomous power sharing.
Zaikai. One popular belief is that the top group of business grouping/conglomerates control the LDP and bureaucrats. This is false. Business associations do have extremely big power.
One such federation is Keidanren, a grouping of leading industrial organizations (auto, ship building, iron and steel, petroleum, chemical, trading companies, wholesale, banks, insurance, securities, etc.). Also important is Nikkeiren (Japan Federation of Employers Association), which keeps the labor movement in check and keeps wage increases down.
Viewed as a class, contemporary businessmen buy political power on a regularly basis. They maintain leverage over most LDP Diet members by footing re-election campaigns. But their power is still limited, and informal bureaucratic control over business reaches far. So business still relies on LDP to interact with bureaucracy.
So, these three bodies all share power, and no eloquent equation can show precisely what the shape/sharing of power is. Power fluxes at a given time.
So why was a state not formed after the American occupation? Maybe Americans were expecting a clear dictatorship like Hitler or Mussolini, and so were no good at dismantling the informal networks. If anything they cut out some deadwood when dismantling zaibatsu, and otherwise clearing house with the mass firing of government officials (who many they later let back in anyway, as the Korean war came on and America realized they needed Japan strong).
Additionally after 1945 Japan never had to worry if it was a state or not, since it was hardly ever called upon to act as a political entity. Japan became dependent on the US not only for it's defense, but also it's diplomacy. Japan was able to deal with countries on the basis of purely economic priorities, with less regard to political consequences. Though this is changing.
Other sources of power. The press have a lot of influence on popular sentiment, though the newspaper dailies and news tend to speak as one voice.
The National Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives presides over local co-op's, regional federations, and special business organizations that represent over 8% of Japan's workforce employed in farming. It has a symbiotic relationship with the Ministry of Agriculture. The ministry, in cooperation with LDP, keeps rice prices high. In return, LDP candidates in rural areas are given near unconditional support.
There is also of course the yakuza with their huge protection rackets and control of entertainment districts. The police maintain an unacknowledged symbiotic relationship with the gangster syndicates in the interesting of keeping crime under organized control.
So how does the public perceive state? Tax collector, the police, and vast body of regulations. But this perception may vanish when accountability is called into question. For instance, most Japanese historically consider the puppet state of Manchuko to be "the army's" colony, but not Japan's.
So there is a tendency for Japanese to not see themselves as being symbolically part of a state whose responsibility they therefore share.
The system. Author uses the term 'System' instead of state to define Japan body politic. He says "it denotes little more than the existence of a set of relationships, with reasonably predictable effects, between those engaged in socio-political pursuits." The individual is rarely allowed to forget the existence of socio-political arrangements that are infinitely stronger than the individual could ever bear.
Public-private realm. When comparing employment numbers in Japan's public realm vs. Private to other countries, Japan comes in surprisingly low. Japan's number of public employee's is 1/3 of Britain and about one half of the USA and Germany. However the difference is once again the delineation of power. In the other powers, state interference can be dulled out as needed, for praise of punishment. But Japanese bureaucratic participation tends to resist analysis.
There are however several processes done by bureaucracies that can be singled out in terms of public-private interaction. The Japanese government have power of awarding licenses and other permission for commercial pursuits, withholding advantages like subsidies, tax privileges or low-interesting loans at their discretion.
Every year around three hundred bureaucrats join the business world as directors or senior advisors of corporations (often after retirement). This creates 'smooth communication' between ministries and business. This phenomenon is called amakudarai (decent from heaven). A personal acquaintance with government officials and a close familiarity with bureaucratic priorities is extremely important to 'adjust' policy.
But corporations, it should be remembered, are not autonomous, but semi-autonomous. Most companies belong to conglomerates. Between 60-70 percent of all shares in the Japanese stock exchange are held by Japanese corps or financial institutions. They keep shares within their conglomerate family, in a pattern of reciprocal shareholding. The shares are considered to be political rather than investment, and are never sold. This eliminates the possibility of take-overs by outsiders.
As to small entrepreneurs, they are generally subcontracters under larger firms. However they are often dependent on the market to a limited extent. Collectively they are a shock-absorbing cushion in periods of economic downturn, and explain the large bankruptcy rate in Japan, as they often go under during bad economic times.
In summary. The system has a unity in purpose in disseminating a particular world-view that encourages the maintenance of existing power. However it has a weak ability in a crisis to sacrifice existing power relations for the sake of a unified policy program.
Myths about Japan and Individualism
One phenomenon used when interacting with the rest of the world is the buffer.
The buffer are the company persons charged with interacting with foreign entities. The trick to buffers is that even though it may seem they are a person of charge, because of the nature of the curved-top pyramid hierarchy, that person can not have real authority.
Informants represent the small group of people through which the rest of the world learns about Japan. The small community of bi-linguals that have been indoctrinated into the Japanese socio-political view of power. Usually who are in contact with foreign press, etc.
Foreigners also spread disinformation about the "positive" things about Japanese power system. To become an expert in the system, these people have had to become part of the Japanese system. To criticize it means risking alienating themselves from the system, and they will lose their expert position. So such analyses is questionable. The power system discourages criticism.
Aura of inscrutability. One popular concept among Japanese is that they are not understandable to foreigners. "The idea that there is a spiritual dimension to being Japanese, which by definition cannot be grasped by foreigners, is an important ingredient for Japanese self-esteem and therefore widely believed." "It is almost an article of faith among Japanese that their culture is unique, not in the way that all cultures are unique, but somehow uniquely unique."
Westerners have helped this idea along with notion that Japan is utterly strange or different. "Interpretation of Japan as a cohesive entity that can stand on its own, culturally cut off from the rest of the world and essential different from it has remained seductive to many serious observers." There's is a relationship here westerners think Japan is extremely strange, Japanese convert that strangeness concept to uniquely unique, and back and forth. Japan is just another country, right?
Many times it has been suggested Japan "is at a crossroads." It is a myth. In the 1960's it was said Japanese youth was going to change things once they had positions of influence. In the 70's all the employees that went abroad were going to internationalize Japan. Later it was thought that internationalization of the Japanese financial markets would bring about some huge change. This pattern reflects Western preconceptions about the possible forms that institutions and organizations of affairs in non-western nations can take.
Since the uniquely unique, cohesive entity standing on it's own, and crossroads models don't explain current Japanese cultural environment, what does? What has come to shape Japan is power.
Japan's historical isolation meant that those in power could filter foreign elements they perceived at threatening to their control. Wide control over subversive thinking. And since no concept of universal truth was ever established in Japanese thinking (situational instead) there was no intellectual leverage over the power of the politically elite.
Author states that supposedly typical aspects of Japanese society and culture are sustained for political purposes (group life, company loyalty and love of harmony, lack of individualism, near absence of litigation)
Why do people not want to think about power in Japan as an explanation? Hard to see who is in power, Power is highly diffuse, making it pervasive but not immediately noticeable (as opposed to say a dictator or someone in absolute power).
How does power affect the individual? Less freedom. Repression of individual. It has been common recently to dismiss ideal of personal growth as a manifestation of Western ethnocentrism. Japanese are still individuals, but often times not encouraged show it or cultivate it.
The buffer are the company persons charged with interacting with foreign entities. The trick to buffers is that even though it may seem they are a person of charge, because of the nature of the curved-top pyramid hierarchy, that person can not have real authority.
Informants represent the small group of people through which the rest of the world learns about Japan. The small community of bi-linguals that have been indoctrinated into the Japanese socio-political view of power. Usually who are in contact with foreign press, etc.
Foreigners also spread disinformation about the "positive" things about Japanese power system. To become an expert in the system, these people have had to become part of the Japanese system. To criticize it means risking alienating themselves from the system, and they will lose their expert position. So such analyses is questionable. The power system discourages criticism.
Aura of inscrutability. One popular concept among Japanese is that they are not understandable to foreigners. "The idea that there is a spiritual dimension to being Japanese, which by definition cannot be grasped by foreigners, is an important ingredient for Japanese self-esteem and therefore widely believed." "It is almost an article of faith among Japanese that their culture is unique, not in the way that all cultures are unique, but somehow uniquely unique."
Westerners have helped this idea along with notion that Japan is utterly strange or different. "Interpretation of Japan as a cohesive entity that can stand on its own, culturally cut off from the rest of the world and essential different from it has remained seductive to many serious observers." There's is a relationship here westerners think Japan is extremely strange, Japanese convert that strangeness concept to uniquely unique, and back and forth. Japan is just another country, right?
Many times it has been suggested Japan "is at a crossroads." It is a myth. In the 1960's it was said Japanese youth was going to change things once they had positions of influence. In the 70's all the employees that went abroad were going to internationalize Japan. Later it was thought that internationalization of the Japanese financial markets would bring about some huge change. This pattern reflects Western preconceptions about the possible forms that institutions and organizations of affairs in non-western nations can take.
Since the uniquely unique, cohesive entity standing on it's own, and crossroads models don't explain current Japanese cultural environment, what does? What has come to shape Japan is power.
Japan's historical isolation meant that those in power could filter foreign elements they perceived at threatening to their control. Wide control over subversive thinking. And since no concept of universal truth was ever established in Japanese thinking (situational instead) there was no intellectual leverage over the power of the politically elite.
Author states that supposedly typical aspects of Japanese society and culture are sustained for political purposes (group life, company loyalty and love of harmony, lack of individualism, near absence of litigation)
Why do people not want to think about power in Japan as an explanation? Hard to see who is in power, Power is highly diffuse, making it pervasive but not immediately noticeable (as opposed to say a dictator or someone in absolute power).
How does power affect the individual? Less freedom. Repression of individual. It has been common recently to dismiss ideal of personal growth as a manifestation of Western ethnocentrism. Japanese are still individuals, but often times not encouraged show it or cultivate it.
8/7/2003
Japanese Power, Power as defining Culture, Communism, Situational Belief, Changeable Reality
Reading The Enigma of Japanese Power. So far an interesting book, though some parts are questionable. It's a systematic examination of the influence of power in Japanese society. It particularly focuses on how power has shaped culture in Japan.
What drives Japanese society? People always says communalism. Japanese communalism is the result of political arrangements consciously inserted into society by a ruling elite over three centuries ago. Individuals must accept as inevitable that their intellectual and psychological growth are restrained by the will of the collectively. That supposedly collective will is presented by superiors as benevolent, devoid of power, and wholly determined by a unique culture. The concept of collectivity is used to keep the power structure.
The idea of a responsible central government is a fiction. No one is ultimately in charge. The powerful are ministry officials, political cliques and bureaucrat-businessmen clusters, and to a lesser extent agricultural groups, police, the press, and the yakuza. Power is shared within these groups, semi-autonomous components. Each has a kind of discretionary power that undermines the authority of the state. This splintering of power creates a hierarchy with no peak. There is no supreme institution with ultimate policy making jurisdiction. This makes new policies hard as hell to implement. This is why high-ups in the government can never deliver on their political promises.
Political scientist Chalmers Johnson calls Japan (along with Taiwan and Korea) a capitalist development state (CDS). What makes CDS states strong is partnerships between bureaucrats and industrialists. Bureaucrats isolated in the middle of the government can never know the right way to stimulate the economy. Use businessmen as their antenna to tune what fiscal measures they should take. No concept of private business being against the goals of the government.
Malleable realities. Argument is that Japanese organize reality differently then Westerners. The books says it is socially acceptable in Japan for reality to be "consist of not results of objective observation, but an emotionally constructed picture in which things are portrayed the way they are supposed to be?" Author doesn't provide any detailed evidence for this (though this is the intro chapter).
More tolerance for contradiction or multiple realities. Is this flexibility positive or does it have a negative side? How do you have a concrete discussion with no objective reality defined >_<
Lack of absolute principle. Author says the most crucial factor determing Japan's socio-political reality is "the near absense of any idea that there can be truths, rules, principles, or morales that always apply, no matter what the circumstances." This is again the situational as opposed to principle baced viewpoint that gets talked about a lot. I don't think the author is condemning this viewpoint, but it has to be remembered when thinking about the role of power in Japan. He says "Westerners take it for granted that all advanced civilations develop concepts of unviersal validity, and they are therefore not prompted to examine the effects of their absence."
Situational belief + maniputable/changeable reality == malleable fiction
As I can tell, this is esentially the formula he is suggesting for how those in power can manipulate thought.
What drives Japanese society? People always says communalism. Japanese communalism is the result of political arrangements consciously inserted into society by a ruling elite over three centuries ago. Individuals must accept as inevitable that their intellectual and psychological growth are restrained by the will of the collectively. That supposedly collective will is presented by superiors as benevolent, devoid of power, and wholly determined by a unique culture. The concept of collectivity is used to keep the power structure.
The idea of a responsible central government is a fiction. No one is ultimately in charge. The powerful are ministry officials, political cliques and bureaucrat-businessmen clusters, and to a lesser extent agricultural groups, police, the press, and the yakuza. Power is shared within these groups, semi-autonomous components. Each has a kind of discretionary power that undermines the authority of the state. This splintering of power creates a hierarchy with no peak. There is no supreme institution with ultimate policy making jurisdiction. This makes new policies hard as hell to implement. This is why high-ups in the government can never deliver on their political promises.
Political scientist Chalmers Johnson calls Japan (along with Taiwan and Korea) a capitalist development state (CDS). What makes CDS states strong is partnerships between bureaucrats and industrialists. Bureaucrats isolated in the middle of the government can never know the right way to stimulate the economy. Use businessmen as their antenna to tune what fiscal measures they should take. No concept of private business being against the goals of the government.
Malleable realities. Argument is that Japanese organize reality differently then Westerners. The books says it is socially acceptable in Japan for reality to be "consist of not results of objective observation, but an emotionally constructed picture in which things are portrayed the way they are supposed to be?" Author doesn't provide any detailed evidence for this (though this is the intro chapter).
More tolerance for contradiction or multiple realities. Is this flexibility positive or does it have a negative side? How do you have a concrete discussion with no objective reality defined >_<
Lack of absolute principle. Author says the most crucial factor determing Japan's socio-political reality is "the near absense of any idea that there can be truths, rules, principles, or morales that always apply, no matter what the circumstances." This is again the situational as opposed to principle baced viewpoint that gets talked about a lot. I don't think the author is condemning this viewpoint, but it has to be remembered when thinking about the role of power in Japan. He says "Westerners take it for granted that all advanced civilations develop concepts of unviersal validity, and they are therefore not prompted to examine the effects of their absence."
Situational belief + maniputable/changeable reality == malleable fiction
As I can tell, this is esentially the formula he is suggesting for how those in power can manipulate thought.
